Sunday, 1 May 2016

Let's consider the omnipotence paradox:
Premise 1: If God can create a rock so heavy he can't lift lift it then God cannot lift the rock.
Premise 2: If God cannot create a rock so heavy he can't lift lift it then he is not maximally omnipotent.
Premise 3: If God cannot lift the rock then he is not maximally omnipotent.
Conclusion: God is not maximally omnipotent.

The premise 'If God can create a rock so heavy he can't lift it then God cannot lift the rock' is incorrect. By definition, maximal omnipotence means that God can do anything that can be phrased, without limitation from logic. Even if the rock cannot be lifted by defying logic, because God is maximally omnipotent, he can lift the rock, while he cannot lift it, without it being true that he cannot lift it, if he makes that happen, which he can because he's maximally omnipotent. Even if the second premise was true, God could still be omnipotent because he could make it so that he is omnipotent while he is not omnipotent, even without it being true that he is not omnipotent. This is logically impossible, but, by the definition of being maximally omnipotent, God is able to make this, or anything, a reality.

Let's use an analogy:
I am narratively omnipotent. I can narrate anything. I'd wager that I can also narrate anything with ease. Watch: 'Something of anything happens'. Boom. Done. 'Everything happens, in exactly the right way for me, without any loopholes', just for good measure. I narrate 'I am not maximally omnipotent. There are things I can't do'. I also narrate 'Only one of two things are possible, either I am maximally omnipotent or I am not maximally omnipotent.' Then I narrate 'That is true and I am not maximally omnipotent, but simultaneously I am maximally omnipotent. I then do everything, including all the things I cannot do'. Yes, I really can and did narrate that. Screw the rules. If I can narrate anything and can narrate being maximally omnipotent, it logically follows that if God can do anything that can be phrased, he can, by definition, make himself maximally omnipotent even if he's not and make it false that he is not maximally omnipotent and therefore he would be maximally omnipotent and it would be false that he is not maximally omnipotent because he would have made it that way because he can because he is maximally omnipotent, if he is maximally omnipotent.

I can sum it up in three sentences: If God is maximally omnipotent, he can do anything that can be phrased. If God can do anything that can be phrased, he can do anything that can be phrased and it is false to say that God can't do anything that can be phrased. If God can do anything that can be phrased, he can do anything because 'God does anything' and its derivatives can be phrased.

I don't know how I can make it any clearer. If you disagree with me after that perfect logic, my guess is that you're either invested in my conclusion being false and are in denial or you're a moron.

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