Friday, 20 May 2016
How do we know anything? We might be able to say that we know something because of a justification, but that justification also needs to be justified by a justification to even be a justification. Every justification needs its own justification, either to infinity (good luck with getting infinite justifications), or until the justifications are circular. Without using circular reasoning, it's infeasible for you to know anything, even whether or not circular reasoning is valid. So, how do I know anything? Simple, I know God lets me know through science and observation and God lets me know that he lets me know. I am justified in believing this is true because it must be true because it is true; it is true therefore it is true. If there's something wrong with circular reasoning, prove it or you don't know that. Good luck doing that if circular reasoning and assumptions are invalid in proving things.
Thursday, 12 May 2016
What of the doomsday argument? It can be summed up like
this. There is a bag of marbles. You take a marble from the bag at random. You
know that the number of black marbles in the bag was chosen by the roll of a
1000 sided die. If the die rolls 1 (where almost every civilisation is wiped
out before producing a lot of people), there will be few black marbles in the
bag. But if the dice does not roll 1, almost all of the marbles will be black,
because there are so many. If you exist before the 22nd century, you’ve
pulled out a white marble. If you exist after that, you’ve pulled out a black
marble. If there are 15 marbles in the bag (these numbers are rounded) and the
1000 sided die rolls any other number than 1, all 15 marbles are black. If the
die roll was 1, at least 1 marble is white. To get a white marble would be
highly unlikely, but, there it is... or so you think.
The factor you didn’t take into account is that you might
have been hypnotised to see a black marble as a white marble (this is the
analogue of a future civilisation creating simulations of the 21st
century with simulated people occupying that simulation). You were under
hypnosis during the session, so you don’t remember what you have or haven’t
been hypnotised to see. Even if it’s a 1 in 10 chance that you’ve been
hypnotised to see a black marble as a white marble, it’s still 100 times as
likely as getting a real white marble. The odds of the marble you took from the
bag being a real white marble is at least 1 in 100. 99% likely, when you see a
white marble, it is really a black marble, so you rightly conclude that your
marble is black (and therefore you live in the future).
The next thing to determine is the intentions of the
simulator. Have they left any clues in the way humanity has been treated (in
this simulation in the past)? Is our world like a weird sci-fi movie scenario;
maybe a bit too fantastical to be believed? How many parallels can you spot?
Good may lose battles in movies, but they never lose wars. Good always wins in
the end. Is this the same in our world? Will we get a good ending, like in the
movies? Is the world packed with drama, like in the films? Is our suffering
real; are there any ethical hurdles to future generations faking unethical
situations, like our world? Think about it.
Sunday, 1 May 2016
I've seen it discussed that a friendly AI would make everyone omnipotent. My response is 'No, because a friendly AI would put its civilisation first, as per design, and its civilisation would want to simulate beings that are not omnipotent, so the friendly AI would make us be not omnipotent. Also, they might mess with our reasoning and perception to make it look like they wouldn't do that.
Here's the link:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/ixp/does_the_universe_contain_a_friendly_artificial/
Here's the link:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/ixp/does_the_universe_contain_a_friendly_artificial/
Let's consider the omnipotence paradox:
Premise 1: If God can create a rock so heavy he can't lift lift it then God cannot lift the rock.
Premise 2: If God cannot create a rock so heavy he can't lift lift it then he is not maximally omnipotent.
Premise 3: If God cannot lift the rock then he is not maximally omnipotent.
Conclusion: God is not maximally omnipotent.
The premise 'If God can create a rock so heavy he can't lift it then God cannot lift the rock' is incorrect. By definition, maximal omnipotence means that God can do anything that can be phrased, without limitation from logic. Even if the rock cannot be lifted by defying logic, because God is maximally omnipotent, he can lift the rock, while he cannot lift it, without it being true that he cannot lift it, if he makes that happen, which he can because he's maximally omnipotent. Even if the second premise was true, God could still be omnipotent because he could make it so that he is omnipotent while he is not omnipotent, even without it being true that he is not omnipotent. This is logically impossible, but, by the definition of being maximally omnipotent, God is able to make this, or anything, a reality.
Let's use an analogy:
I am narratively omnipotent. I can narrate anything. I'd wager that I can also narrate anything with ease. Watch: 'Something of anything happens'. Boom. Done. 'Everything happens, in exactly the right way for me, without any loopholes', just for good measure. I narrate 'I am not maximally omnipotent. There are things I can't do'. I also narrate 'Only one of two things are possible, either I am maximally omnipotent or I am not maximally omnipotent.' Then I narrate 'That is true and I am not maximally omnipotent, but simultaneously I am maximally omnipotent. I then do everything, including all the things I cannot do'. Yes, I really can and did narrate that. Screw the rules. If I can narrate anything and can narrate being maximally omnipotent, it logically follows that if God can do anything that can be phrased, he can, by definition, make himself maximally omnipotent even if he's not and make it false that he is not maximally omnipotent and therefore he would be maximally omnipotent and it would be false that he is not maximally omnipotent because he would have made it that way because he can because he is maximally omnipotent, if he is maximally omnipotent.
I can sum it up in three sentences: If God is maximally omnipotent, he can do anything that can be phrased. If God can do anything that can be phrased, he can do anything that can be phrased and it is false to say that God can't do anything that can be phrased. If God can do anything that can be phrased, he can do anything because 'God does anything' and its derivatives can be phrased.
I don't know how I can make it any clearer. If you disagree with me after that perfect logic, my guess is that you're either invested in my conclusion being false and are in denial or you're a moron.
Premise 1: If God can create a rock so heavy he can't lift lift it then God cannot lift the rock.
Premise 2: If God cannot create a rock so heavy he can't lift lift it then he is not maximally omnipotent.
Premise 3: If God cannot lift the rock then he is not maximally omnipotent.
Conclusion: God is not maximally omnipotent.
The premise 'If God can create a rock so heavy he can't lift it then God cannot lift the rock' is incorrect. By definition, maximal omnipotence means that God can do anything that can be phrased, without limitation from logic. Even if the rock cannot be lifted by defying logic, because God is maximally omnipotent, he can lift the rock, while he cannot lift it, without it being true that he cannot lift it, if he makes that happen, which he can because he's maximally omnipotent. Even if the second premise was true, God could still be omnipotent because he could make it so that he is omnipotent while he is not omnipotent, even without it being true that he is not omnipotent. This is logically impossible, but, by the definition of being maximally omnipotent, God is able to make this, or anything, a reality.
Let's use an analogy:
I am narratively omnipotent. I can narrate anything. I'd wager that I can also narrate anything with ease. Watch: 'Something of anything happens'. Boom. Done. 'Everything happens, in exactly the right way for me, without any loopholes', just for good measure. I narrate 'I am not maximally omnipotent. There are things I can't do'. I also narrate 'Only one of two things are possible, either I am maximally omnipotent or I am not maximally omnipotent.' Then I narrate 'That is true and I am not maximally omnipotent, but simultaneously I am maximally omnipotent. I then do everything, including all the things I cannot do'. Yes, I really can and did narrate that. Screw the rules. If I can narrate anything and can narrate being maximally omnipotent, it logically follows that if God can do anything that can be phrased, he can, by definition, make himself maximally omnipotent even if he's not and make it false that he is not maximally omnipotent and therefore he would be maximally omnipotent and it would be false that he is not maximally omnipotent because he would have made it that way because he can because he is maximally omnipotent, if he is maximally omnipotent.
I can sum it up in three sentences: If God is maximally omnipotent, he can do anything that can be phrased. If God can do anything that can be phrased, he can do anything that can be phrased and it is false to say that God can't do anything that can be phrased. If God can do anything that can be phrased, he can do anything because 'God does anything' and its derivatives can be phrased.
I don't know how I can make it any clearer. If you disagree with me after that perfect logic, my guess is that you're either invested in my conclusion being false and are in denial or you're a moron.
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